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I. INTRODUCTION
The central and overarching question in the law concerning bound-
ary disputes is whether the legal outcomes should be governed by the
written evidence of title or by the conflicting actual location of the par-
ties on the ground. There is, of course, good reason for the rule, en-
shrined in the Statute of Frauds, that transfers of interests in land
must be in writing. A land transfer system dominated by oral convey-
ances would be characterized by a great deal of insecurity and uncer-
tainty about that most fundamental question of who owns exactly
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what. And it has been convincingly argued that one of the main rea-
sons for the immense productivity differences between developed and
undeveloped economies lies in the fact that the title to assets, and es-
pecially to real property, is certain and secure in the former countries
but not in the latter.1 The exceptions to a general rule favoring the
written record must, therefore, be limited to those cases where there is
a powerful countervailing policy.
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Both legislatures and courts have found that there are situations
that exhibit those convincing reasons to depart from the record. The
well-known doctrine of adverse possession is, of course, a creature of
statute which has existed in some form at least since the thirteenth
century. More particularly, adverse possession is based on a statute of
limitations that bars any action of ejectment by an owner (hereinafter
0) seeking recovery of land from a person (hereinafter P) who has
been in possession for more than the statutory period. The policy of
repose underlying all statutes of limitation also justifies adverse pos-
session. The notion is that after some extended period of time the law
must finally recognize the validity of a long continuing reality. The
reason for this is clear. Picture a system where the paper title could
never be varied by the facts on the ground. Imagine that in 1840, 0
owns property to a certain line, and his neighbor P owns the adjoining
land. P occupies a fifty foot strip of O's land. The properties pass from
0 and P to the succeeding generations of each family until 1990 when
O's great-great-great grandchild sues P's successors for the strip that
1. Hernando de Soto, president of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy in Peru,
makes the case for certain titling very strongly. He indicates that the titles to
most of the land in the underdeveloped countries is very uncertain, adding:
I predict that in the next 150 years the countries in Latin America
and elsewhere joining these 25 [developed market economy countries]
will be those that spend their energies ensuring that property rights are
widespread and protected by law, rather than those that continue to fo-
cus on macroeconomic policy.
Why? Because there is not enough property in developing countries
to make markets work. The difference between developed and underde-
veloped countries, after all, is not that the former have markets and the
latter do not. Markets are an old and universal tradition: Christ threw
merchants out of the temple 2,000 years ago, and we Peruvians were
taking our products to market long before Columbus reached America.
The difference between developed and underdeveloped countries is the
difference between buying gold futures on the London Metal Exchange
and buying gold nuggets on a pavement in Madre de Dios, Peru. In Brit-
ain the legal system has created property rights that can be exchanged
in an expanded market, whereas in Peru it has not. Britain is a property
economy, Peru is not.
Hernando de Sot, The Missing Ingredient, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11-17, 1993, at 8, 8
(special insert).
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P's family has occupied for 150 years. Do we really want to litigate the
"proper" boundary after such a period of time? The problems of proof
and dislocation in that kind of a case would be horrendous and solving
them would not be worth the candle. So the elapse of a long time, with
two neighbors mutually adhering to a certain line, must eventually
cause the law to recognize that it is no longer appropriate to look back
to determine whether their paper titles dictate a different outcome. If
that is so, then the only question is how long a waiting period should
the law require before it refuses to countenance that kind of retrospec-
tive. The statutes on adverse possession across the United States gen-
erally provide for periods of five to forty years.2
It is interesting that there is a conflict between the rules governing
adverse possession and the widely recognized policy of repose that is
said to underlie it. This is so because, though the original statutes of
limitations that were the basis of the doctrine purported merely to bar
an action of ejectment after a certain period of time, they were con-
strued with a multi-faceted judicial gloss that to an extent defeated
the policy. In time some of the states amended their statutes to in-
clude the judicial gloss as part of their statutory language.3
Thus, as the doctrine evolved, it was required, whether by case or
by statute, that P's possession be actual, open and notorious, exclu-
sive, continuous, and hostile under claim of right.4 The first four of
the requirements all relate to whether the nature of P's physical occu-
pancy is such as to give 0 notice of a potential hostile claim to his
property. They thus have essentially the same policy basis: viz., to
assure that 0 will be in a position to understand that, unless he brings
his suit in ejectment before the statute of limitations runs, he will for-
feit the title to his property. Those requirements are completely de-
fensible in that they are an attempt by the courts to define exactly the
kind of physical relationship to the land that the statute of limitations
contemplates before its mandated transfer of ownership can occur.
The court-invented requirement of hostility under claim of right is of a
different character, however; it pertains not to physical but to intangi-
ble matters, including questions concerning the possessor's intent and
the nature of the relationship between the two parties. It is submitted
that those courts that have invented requirements concerning posses-
sor intent have drifted far from any defensible rule.
2. For a complete listing of the adverse possession statutes of every state, with a
summary of each statutes' contents, see 10 BUDDY O.H. HERmNG Er AL., THoA1n-
SON ON REAL PROPERTY § 87.01, at 75-81 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) [hereinafter
THompsON]. For an older compilation, see William Edwin Taylor, Titles to Land
by Adverse Possession, 20 IOWA L. REv. 551, 552-54 (1935).
3. See THOmPSON, supra note 2, § 87.01, at 75-81 (listing the elements of each state's
adverse possession statute(s)).
4. See 16 RIcHARD R. PowELL, PowELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1013[1], at 91-14 (Pat-
rick J. Rohan ed., 1998).
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There are different views in the various states on the question of
what possessor intent is required. Some states mandate that she be in
good faith and be unaware that she is trespassing on her neighbor's
property.5 Other states take the opposite position that, in order for
her possession to be hostile, she must intend to take the property
knowing full well that she is a trespasser.6 And in some states if P is
occupying up to what she mistakenly thinks is the true line, she will
get title by adverse possession, but only if she intends to claim title up
to where she possesses, true line or not,7 while, on the other hand, if
her intent is to claim only what she is legally entitled to, adverse pos-
session will not lie.8 Perhaps most of the states take the position that
P's state of mind is irrelevant 9 is clearly the best view. It is what P is
doing, not what she is thinking, that has a bearing on whether O's
attention has been called to the fact that he must sue promptly or lose
his land. The only view requiring some form of possessor intent that
has a reasonable argument in its behalf is the view demanding that
she have a pure heart if she is to get title by adverse possession. The
argument would, of course, be that a person should not benefit from
5. See, e.g., Halpern v. Lacy Inv. Corp., 379 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. 1989). Professor Helm-
holz claims that many courts make a requirement of good faith as a practical
matter while not specifically stating that they are doing so. See R.H. Helmholz,
Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 341-49 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1952).
7. See Preble v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 27 A. 149 (Me. 1893).
8. See id. Therein the court said:
Indeed, the authorities all agree that [the] intention of the occupant to
claim the ownership of land not embraced in his title is a necessary ele-
ment of adverse possession; and in case of occupancy by mistake beyond
a line capable of being ascertained this intention to claim title to the
extent of the occupancy must appear to be absolute, and not conditional;
otherwise the possession will not be deemed adverse to the true owner. It
must be an intention to claim title to all land within a certain boundary
on the face of the earth, whether it shall eventually be found to be the
correct one or not. If, for instance, one in ignorance of his actual bounda-
ries takes and holds possession by mistake up to a certain fence beyond
his limits, upon the claim and in the belief that it is the true line, with
the intention to claim title, and thus, if necessary, to acquire "title by
possession" up to that fence, such possession, having the requisite dura-
tion and continuity, will ripen into title ....
If, on the other hand, a party through ignorance, inadvertence, or
mistake occupies up to a given fence beyond his actual boundary, be-
cause he believes it to be the true line, but has no intention to claim title
to that extent if it should be ascertained that the fence was on his neigh-
bor's land, an indispensable element of adverse possession is wanting.
In such a case the intent to claim title exists only upon the condition that
the fence is on the true line. The intention is not absolute, but provi-
sional, and the possession is not adverse.
Id. at 150 (citations omitted).
9. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431 (Wash. 1984); see also 3 SIDNEY POST
SIMPSON ET AL., AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 15.4, at 776-77 (A. James Casner
ed., 1952) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY].
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her consciously wrongful act.'o But it is submitted that such a re-
quirement universally applied would have a markedly detrimental ef-
fect on the title clearing function of the doctrine of adverse possession.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is clear that since ejectment
will lie against P for her continuing trespass no matter whether her
intent is innocent or wrongful, the statute of limitation barring O's
cause of action in ejectment should likewise apply to bar his right irre-
spective of her intent."
The "hostility" requirement properly interpreted should merely
mean that the possession is without O's permission or that of his au-
thorized agent.12 Permission, in the sense used here involves a situa-
tion in which an owner expressly authorizes another person, whether
she be a tenant, licensee, or contracting buyer, temporarily to use or
occupy his land. The without-permission rule has been universally
followed.' 3 It performs the same policy function of giving 0 appropri-
ate notice as has been discussed above. Thus, if 0 gives P temporary
license to possess a strip of land along the border between them, it is
implicit in the giving of that authorization, first, that 0 is asserting
his ownership, and second, that P is acknowledging O's superior posi-
tion. The latter point is particularly important because P's acknowl-
edgment causes 0 to think that P is not claiming against him and,
therefore, there is no necessity that he sue to protect his interest.
10. See Helmholz, supra note 5, at 341-49.
11. In AmicAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 15.4, at 774, the authors state:
It is amazing that the courts in declaring these supposed require-
ments of adverse possession have so completely failed to consider the
basic question involved in the acquisition of title by the running of the
statute of limitations against the true owner's action of ejectment, viz.,
whether the true owner had a right of action in ejectment against the
wrongful possessor continuing without interruption for the statutory pe-
riod. In very few cases, in applying these supposed requirements, have
the courts discussed the operation of the statute in barring the true
owner's action as the sole reason why title arises by adverse possession.
Do the courts mean to say in these cases that an actual wrongful posses-
sion acquired and maintained without the consent of the true owner is
not wrongful and that the owner cannot maintain ejectment against the
possessor unless the latter is claiming the title; that actual wrongful pos-
session is not adverse, and not subject to the ejectment action if the pos-
sessor admits that he made no claim to the title during his years of
wrongful possession? If the right of action in ejectment accrues in the
owner's favor in such cases, can the courts explain why the statute of
limitations restricting the time within which such actions can be brought
does not apply? If the statute bars the true owner's action to recover the
property can there be any question that his title is extinguished and the
possessory title of the wrongful possessor becomes absolute? These are
the important questions which must be kept in mind in examining the
cases.
12. See ROGER A- CuNNnTGHAM ET AL., THE LAw OF PROPERTY § 11.7, at 811 (2d ed.
1993).
13. See id.
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In summary, there is a conflict between the rules governing ad-
verse possession and the policy of repose that underlies it. In attempt-
ing to prevent 0 from losing his property without being fairly apprised
of P's possible claim against him, and for other less defensible reasons,
the courts have required the possessor to prove some additional ele-
ments not appearing in the statute, with the consequence that not all
long-standing possessions will result in the transfer of ownership that
the policy of repose would seem to call for. Such transfer would not
occur in those cases where P originally took possession with O's per-
mission or, unfortunately in some states, where P does not have the
particular state of mind required in that jurisdiction. 14
III. THE PRACTICAL LOCATION DOCTRINES
The basic idea behind the law of adverse possession is contained in
the name of the concept itself, i.e., the relationship between the par-
ties must be adverse or hostile to each other. This leaves a huge gap
to be filled: what about cases where the parties mutually consent to a
certain boundary between them? If P by a boundary agreement is oc-
cupying up to a certain line, and she is thereby partly on O's property
as defined in the relevant pieces of paper, she would not be a tres-
passer, as she has entered with O's consent.15 In such a case, the stat-
ute of limitations for adverse possession would never run and title
never pass. Of course, if 0 were to revoke that consent, then P would
become a trespasser, triggering the running of the statute of limita-
tions on adverse possession against 0, with title eventually passing to
p..6 But the important point is that the doctrine of adverse possession
would never allow the perfection of title in a possessor occupying
under a parol or tacit understanding concerning a boundary.
To fill in the gaps created by the adversity requirement, the courts
developed the practical location doctrines, which, in effect, permitted
parol, consensual transfers of interests in land, in apparent violation
of Statute of Frauds requirement that such transfers be in writing.' 7
The doctrines apply to those particular fact patterns in which the
courts feel that it makes good policy sense to disregard the strictures
of the Statute of Frauds and to supersede the written record. This
generally occurs when neighboring parties have a solid reason to lo-
14. In addition, the statutes of limitations in most states provide for the tolling of the
statute for various disabilities of the owner. These often include infancy, mental
incompetence, and imprisonment. These disabilities can also prevent the appli-
cation of the doctrine of oral agreement or acquiescence. See, e.g., Santee v.
Uhlenhopp, 169 N.W. 321 (Iowa 1918).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 167-75 (1965).
16. See id. § 171.
17. For a complete treatment of the doctrines of practical location, see Olin L. Brow-
der, Jr., The Practical Location of Boundaries, 56 MICH. L. REv. 487 (1958).
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cate a boundary in a place other than that which might be found
through a proper interpretation of the deeds or other documents of
title. For example, it often happens that the written record is unclear
or ambiguous as to where the boundary should be physically located,
thus putting the neighboring parties in the position of having to deal
with the uncertainty. In other cases there is not any objective uncer-
tainty as to the true line, but the parties do not want to go to the
considerable expense that it would take to determine exactly where it
is, and so they set a line agreeable to both. Whatever the cause of
their doubt, however, the parties often try to decide these boundary
questions inexpensively and painlessly by an arrangement in which
they orally or tacitly agree to a particular location on the ground and
then adhere to that understanding thereafter. Indeed there are many
cases in which it is doubtful whether there is between the parties any
"understanding" at all in the normal sense of that word; rather with-
out any discussion they occupy to a certain line for a long period of
time without dispute or rancor. The question for the courts in all
these cases then becomes whether the line adhered to for a period of
time under these varying circumstances should be preferred to the
boundary established in the written instruments of title, properly
interpreted.
Under the general rubric of "practical location," there are three ju-
dicial doctrines that deal with these questions: parol agreement, ac-
quiescence, and estoppel.l 8  Although some courts carefully
distinguish between and treat the first two of these as separate doc-
trines,X9 other courts seem to regard acquiescence merely as evidence
establishing that an oral agreement setting a disputed boundary has
been made.20 Both of them essentially allow a long-continued, consen-
sually-created occupancy to ripen into title. Estoppel, on the other
hand, is analytically separate. It involves a representation by one
owner to an adjoining owner as to the location of the boundary be-
tween them. Title passes when the representation is detrimentally
relied upon by the second owner through her construction of encroach-
ing improvements. This can occur in a relatively short period of time
if the requisite elements of representation and detrimental reliance
are present. In this commentary I am interested in exploring the rela-
tionships between adverse possession and the other doctrines not in-
volving detrimental reliance and will therefore not consider the
matter of estoppel any further.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Shultz v. Johnson, 654 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
20. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Haley, 865 P.2d 961 (Idaho 1993).
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A. Parol Agreement
The cases involving a boundary agreement generally require three
elements: (1) a dispute or uncertainty regarding the location of the
boundary; (2) an oral or implied agreement settling the matter; and (3)
possession to or recognition of the line by the parties for some period of
time.2 ' Each one of these elements requires some further
explanation.
1. Dispute or Uncertainty.
Almost every case in the area requires that there be a dispute or
uncertainty for the boundary agreement to be valid.22 The supposed
justification for this requirement is that these agreements are contrac-
tual in nature and therefore require legal consideration for their valid-
ity.23 The argument is that, if there were no dispute or uncertainty as
to where the correct line was, and the two parties agreed to modify the
line, then the person surrendering some land in the agreement would
be receiving no consideration for his act, since the other party would
be giving up nothing in return. On the other hand, if there were such
a dispute or uncertainty, the other party would be giving up her claim
to the land in question, thereby suffering a detriment and conferring a
benefit, which would constitute valuable consideration.
The difficulty with the consideration argument is that it neglects a
very important point, viz., that it should not apply to a fully performed
contract. After the understanding has been mutually adhered to by
the parties for a substantial period of time, the deal has been executed
and it would seem that want of consideration should be an irrelevance.
The case should be analogized to the court decisions on the executed
gift discharge of obligations under a contract, where consideration is
unnecessary. 24 In this case the execution consists of the delivery of
the property to the other party. If consideration is unnecessary for an
executed agreement, then it surely follows that the requirement of un-
certainty or dispute that supposedly solves the consideration problem
should be dispensed with.
21. See Rath v. Haycock, 905 P.2d 854 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
22. See CuU'IGHAm ET AL., supra note 12, § 11.8, at 816.
23. See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah 1990) ("If actual knowledge of
the boundary exists, there is no consideration exchanged and the agreement
fails.").
24. See 5A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1240-1250 (1964).
Suppose, for example, that a seller is under a duty to deliver a horse to a
buyer that is under a duty to pay for it. If the seller says on delivering
the horse but before payment that this is done as a gift, the seller's state-
ment will be given effect. Because there has been a delivery of the horse,
the buyer's duty to pay for it is discharged. Consideration is irrelevant.
1 E. ALLEN FANswoRTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRACTS § 4.25, at 529 (2d ed. 1998).
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The courts also inappropriately use the uncertainty rule to avoid
the charge that the parol agreement doctrine circumvents the Statute
of Frauds requirement that conveyances of land be in writing. They
do this by engaging in the fiction that when they enforce an agreement
settling a controversy over an uncertain boundary, they are not
countenancing the transfer of an interest in land but are only "defin-
ing or locating on the ground the existing titles of the parties."25 The
sophistry of that position is apparent, for it is clear that in many cases
oral settlements do result in one of the parties getting a larger piece,
and the other a smaller one, than a scientific survey might call for. It
would be much better to admit that a transfer of land is taking place
and the parol agreement doctrine is one of some other exceptions to
the operation of the Statute of Frauds.26
Lastly, it can be argued that a fundamental difficulty with the un-
certainty rule is that it is based upon a faulty premise: viz., that it is
possible to have certainty in boundary line location. In Professor
Browder's opinion, there is no such thing:
A paper description will be enough, to be sure, to tell you in a general way
where your land lies. But anyone at all familiar with litigation over bounda-
ries will know that, for a variety of reasons, few if any of these descriptions
admit of a single and precise application to the ground. It is this hiatus in our
conveyancing practice between a deed describing land and the actual location
on the ground of the boundaries described which causes most of our trouble
over boundaries .... What, then, is the situation of adjoining landowners
whose respective deeds are consistent on paper? Either they are left without
precise knowledge of their boundaries or, what is worse, their only way to a
certain resolution of their doubts is by means of litigation. And even this may
not be conclusive, but only the substitution of a paper decree for a paper de-
scription, leaving the gap still unbridged. All that such parties usually want
is to know their boundaries, and at the beginning of their inquiry they are
usually amicably inclined. Someone may tell them to have their lands sur-
veyed, but of course this alone settles nothing.
2 7
Thus, it can be urged that in the ultimate sense, the requisite un-
certainty is present in all cases and should be a stumbling block in
none. All things considered, it would be better if the uncertainty re-
quirement were completely eliminated as an element in practical loca-
tion doctrine.
2. Oral or Implied Agreement Setting Boundary
The second requirement for a parol agreement is that there be an
oral or implied agreement setting the boundary. The meaning of
"oral" agreement is self-explanatory; the parties by their spoken words
25. Browder, supra note 17, at 497.
26. These would, for example, include such doctrines as adverse possession, title by
estoppel, and title by accretion. See AssxaIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 9,
§§ 15.1-.35, at 755-875.
27. Browder, supra note 17, at 487-88.
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
specifically recognize that the boundary shall be such and such.
Although the cases involving such facts are relatively infrequent as
compared with the total number of practical location cases, still there
are an occasional few that can be found in the reports. 28
The vast majority of the parol agreement cases involve what are
called "implied agreements" where the courts infer the required con-
cordance of the parties from some form of non-verbal conduct. 29 The
conduct typically consists of a physical marking of the boundary by
the construction of a fence or planting of hedges, followed by the par-
ties' mutual compliance with the division line for some period of time.
The overlap between these so-called implied agreements on the one
hand and the doctrine of acquiescence on the other is apparent. After
all, the major difference between the two sets of rules lies in the fact
that the former supposedly involves an agreement as to the boundary
and the latter does not. As soon as that agreement element is permit-
ted to be inferred from the long continued silent assent, which is the
heart of acquiescence, the two doctrines become functionally identical.
3. Possession or Recognition for Some Period of Time
Most of the cases require on-the-ground adherence to the agree-
ment for some period of time after its formation, but there are a few
cases that do not seem to require any post-agreement compliance at
all.3 0 Among those that do, some of the cases are indefinite as to the
time required, 31 some insist that the time be sufficient to show a "set-
tled recognition" of the boundary,32 and some demand possession for
28. See, e.g., Nunley v. Orsburn, 847 S.W.2d 702 (Ark. 1993); Hammack v. Olds, 761
P.2d 541 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
29. See, e.g., Tobin v. Stevens, 251 Cal. Rptr. 587 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Morrissey v.
Haley, 865 P.2d 961 (Idaho 1993); Stone v. Rhodes, 752 P.2d 1112 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988).
30. See, e.g., Webb v. Harris, 315 S.W.2d 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).
31. See, e.g., Thiessen v. Worthington, 68 P. 424 (Or. 1902); Ross v. DeLorenzo, 672
P.2d 1338 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
32. See, e.g., Jones v. Rives, 680 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
The Florida supreme court has said:
The authorities do not fix upon any particular length of possession
under the agreement as essential. In [a previous case], the period inter-
vening between the agreement and occupation and the commencement
of the action in hostility to the agreed line was very short, the agreement
being in the summer of 1854, and the action having been commenced in
September of the same year, while in another case the practical recogni-
tion of the line had continued as long as 30 years. It is expressly decided,
and, in the nature of things, must be, that occupation for the period re-
quired by the statute of limitations to bar a recovery upon the true title
is not necessary. Many other cases are conclusive of the correctness of
this view. It is sufficient if the conduct of the parties shows a settled
recognition of the line covered by the agreement as the permanent
boundary between their lands.
Watrous v. Morrison, 14 So. 805, 808 (Fla. 1894) (citation omitted).
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the statutory period for adverse possession. 33 It would seem to be ap-
propriate to require some post-agreement adherence to the under-
standing in order to prevent the assertion of a completely fictional
story as a means of defrauding the owner of some of his land. The fact
that the parties occupy to a certain line is at least evidence that an
agreement between the parties had earlier actually been reached.
B. The Doctrine of Acquiescence
If neighbors 0 and P knowingly acquiesce in a boundary line by
possessing up to it for some extended period of time, that in law be-
comes the dividing border between the two parties. First of all, to un-
derstand fully the concept of acquiescence one must carefully
distinguish it from the idea of permission. A dictionary definition of
"acquiesce" is "to accept or comply tacitly or passively."34 In most ju-
risdictions mere silence in the face of the other person's continuing
possession is enough to constitute acquiescence, 35 but in a few states
some overt act or words are required.3 6 However, the words or acts in
those cases are not connotative of permission, for permission involves
a situation in which an owner expressly authorizes another person to
temporarily use or occupy his land. As mentioned earlier, implicit in
the permissive relationship is O's assertion of his ownership and P's
acknowledgment thereof, thereby lulling the former into thinking the
latter is not claiming against him. In acquiescence cases, on the other
hand, there are no facts to indicate that P is acknowledging that she is
not herself an owner; the parties are purporting to set the boundary
between them and thereafter conforming to it. Thus it follows 0
should reasonably be on notice that: (1) P is claiming the property as
her own, and (2) that he must sue if he wishes to counter that claim
before his rights are barred by his acquiescence for an extended period
of time.37 The cases properly hold that O's granting of permission to P
forecloses the possible application of the doctrine of acquiescence. 38
33. See, e.g., Bushnell v. Martin, 553 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 1989); Mehdizadeh v. Mincer, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
34. WEBSTr's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONAnY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 18 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1971).
35. See, e.g., Ollinger v. Bennett, 562 N.W.2d 167 (Iowa 1997); Carter v. Hanrath,
885 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 925 P.2d 960 (Utah 1996).
36. See, e.g., Dobrinsky v. Waddell, 599 N.E.2d 188 (IM. App. Ct. 1992).
37. It is, of course, true that the statute of limitations for ejectment would not start to
run unless P is a trespasser. IfP were there by consent under some express or
implied understanding as to boundaries, she would not be a trespasser. What we
are suggesting here is that with the passage of time P would get title by
acquiescence.
38. See Waters v. Spell, 380 S.E.2d 55, 56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) ('The fact that permis-
sion was granted indicates defendants claimed ownership to the property. De-
fendants complained to plaintiffthat they believed the mobile homes were located
on their land some time before 1980. Therefore, the jury could conclude from the
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IV. THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
ACQUIESCENCE AND A COMPARISON WITH THOSE
OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
We analyze here the elements the courts require to make out a
case of acquiescence and note the areas of conflict and overlap between
that doctrine and that of adverse possession. In doing so, it is impor-
tant to note that we are dealing with adverse possession only in its
settlement of boundary disputes function, and not with any of its other
applications. 39
Both acquiescence and adverse possession doctrines require that
the claimant be in "possession" for a certain period. The cases in both
areas appropriately require that the possessor use and enjoy the prop-
erty as a typical owner would with respect to the type of property in-
volved in the lawsuit.4 0 The adverse possession cases require that the
possession be exclusive,41 that is, not shared with the record owner.
There is some limited authority in the acquiescence area that says ex-
clusivity is not required, 42 while other cases take the opposite posi-
tion. 43 It would seem that a sharing of possession of the disputed area
should foreclose a finding of either adverse possession or acquiescence,
as in either case 0 could reasonably assume P is not claiming the
property as her own.44
Similarly, though the cases in adverse possession universally re-
quire that P's possession be continuous,45 there is an apparent split of
evidence that defendants had not acquiesced in establishing the newer fence as
the boundary line.").
39. Those are cases which involve: (1) a long-term trespass by a non-neighbor, result-
ing in a new title in him, and (2) a title clearing function for a record owner in
possession, who might use adverse possession to bar an outstanding right such
as, for example, a marital interest in the spouse of a former owner.
40. The leading case in adverse possession is Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41
(1837). On acquiescence, see Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), rev'd, 925 P.2d 960 (Utah 1996).
41. See, e.g., Dzuris v. Kucharik, 434 P.2d 414 (Colo. 1967).
42. See, e.g., Marja Corp. v. Allain, 622 A.2d 1182 (Me. 1993); Schimp v. Allaman, 659
A.2d 1032 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
43. See, e.g., Grimes v. Armstrong, 304 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1957); Riter v. Cayias, 431
P.2d 788 (Utah 1967).
44. In actuality the exclusivity requirement is a redundancy, as it adds nothing to
the requirement of possession itself. Traditionally an owner of an estate in land
is said to have "possession" of land while the dominant tenant of an easement
merely has the "use" of it. The essence of the distinction between those two terms
lies in the issue of whether there is a right to exclude the rest of the world. Thus
it is said, "Possession means exclusive occupation, which means that the posses-
sor may wholly exclude all others from all parts of the land, without having to
show they will actually interfere with any aspect of use and enjoyment." CuN-
NINGHAM ET AL., supra note 12, § 8.1, at 437 (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970), overruled on
other grounds by Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431 (Wash. 1984).
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authority on the question in the acquiescence area.4 6 Apparent, be-
cause the cases holding continuousness is not required can be read to
merely say that intermittent occupancy is sufficient if it is consistent
with the nature and condition of the premises-something which the
adverse possession decisions tend, in appropriate cases, to categorize
as continuous.
In acquiescence, most of the cases,4 7 but not all,4 8 require that the
dividing line be marked in some way on the ground by a fence, bushes,
or other means. In adverse possession, such is usually not stated as a
requirement, but "[tihe existence of an enclosure by fences, ditches,
hedges or the like, whether or not in conjunction with natural bounds
... is very important in establishing possession, particularly in deter-
mining its extent."49 Certainly it makes sense to require some degree
of clarity and precision as to the exact location of the boundary in the
application of either doctrine.
With respect to acquiescence, some jurisdictions have statutes spe-
cifically setting the minimum necessary time of occupancy;5O in others
the courts require the same period as the statute of limitations for
adverse possession;Sl in still others they mandate acquiescence for a
"long period of years."5 2 In adverse possession matters the courts, of
course, require possession for the statutory period.
The courts overwhelmingly hold that to constitute a valid acquies-
cence both parties must be aware that the line is being treated as a
boundary;5 3 in one state it is said to be sufficient if 0 knew or should
have known that P occupied the disputed property. 54 In adverse pos-
session cases, the courts require that P's possession be open and noto-
rious, 55 so that 0 can with the exercise of reasonable diligence find out
about the trespass.
46. See, e.g., Maia Corp. v. Allain, 622 A.2d 1182 (Me. 1993) (holding continuousness
not necessary); Lien v. Beard, 478 N.W.2d 578 (S.D. 1991) (holding continuous-
ness necessary).
47. See, e.g., Ollinger v. Bennett, 562 N.W.2d 167 (Iowa 1997).
48. See, e.g., Jedlicka v. Clemmer, 677 A.2d 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (ruling it is
not necessary the boundary line be substantial).
49. AhmcANC LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 15.3, at 770.
50. See, e.g, IowA CODE ANN. § 650.14 (West 1995) (setting the minimum time of oc-
cupancy at 10 years); NEB. REv. STAT. § 34-301 (Reissue 1998) (setting the mini-
mum time of occupancy at 10 years).
51. See, e.g., Sackett v. Atyeo, 552 N.W.2d 536 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (citing MICH.
Com-. LAws § 600.5801(4)); Lakeview Farm, Inc. v. Enman, 689 A-2d 1089 (Vt.
1997) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 501).
52. Davis v. Mitchell, 628 A.2d 657, 660 (Me. 1993).
53. See, e.g., Tewes v. Pine Lane Farms, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 1994); Heath v.
Dudley, 530 A.2d 151 (Vt. 1987).
54. See Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 925 P.2d 960
(Utah 1996).
55. See CUNNINm AM ET AL., supra note 12, § 11.7, at 810-11.
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The cases are split on the question of whether there must be a reso-
lution of a dispute or uncertainty before the events will be recognized
as involving acquiescence.6 There is, in most jurisdictions, no similar
requirement in adverse possession matters, but there are a few states
that seem to require that P be in "good faith,"57 that is, ignorant of the
fact that she is a trespasser. This would obviously involve some ele-
ment of uncertainty on her part as to the proper boundary. The argu-
ments against the uncertainty requirement were earlier stated.58
Interestingly, if one were to adopt the most indulgent view of the
cases regarding acquiescence, the rule would be that when two neigh-
bors for a long time tacitly recognize a definite dividing line between
them by their mutual possession, that demarcation would become
their legal boundary.5 9
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOCTRINES OF
ACQUIESCENCE AND PAROL AGREEMENTS
Having considered the relationship of acquiescence to adverse pos-
session, we deal here with its connection to the doctrine of parol agree-
ments. It is submitted that the doctrines of acquiescence and parol
agreements should be thoroughly integrated. It has been pointed out
above that many parol agreement cases involve what are called "im-
plied agreements,"6 0 where the making of the deal is inferred from
subsequent non-verbal conduct. In such situations there is a clear
overlap between the two doctrines and the rules about them ought to
be identical. But even where there is an express oral agreement, it
would appear that the rules about the cases should be the same. The
major differences between the court-required elements in parol agree-
ment versus acquiescence cases lie in two areas: the requirement of
uncertainty or dispute and the length of time of possession held to be
necessary.
56. For cases holding no dispute is required, see Sackett v. Atyeo, 552 N.W.2d 536
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996) and Knox v. Bogan, 472 S.E.2d 43 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996).
For cases holding a dispute is required, see Hutchins v. Strickland, 674 So. 2d
870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) and Wells v. Williamson, 794 P.2d 637 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1989), affd, 794 P.2d 626 (Idaho 1990).
57. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
59. The New York cases seem to recognize that approach, saying that simple acquies-
cence for a long period of time is enough to pass the title. In Katz v. Kaiser, 48
N.E. 532, 533 (N.Y. 1897), the court of appeals said: "It is the settled rule in this
state.., that a practical location of boundaries, which has been acquiesced in for
a long series of years, will not be disturbed." See also Markowski v. Ferrari, 570
N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), appeal dismissed, 582 N.E.2d 598 (N.Y.
1991) ("[Alcquiescence for 'a considerable period of time provides conclusive evi-
dence as to the true location of the boundary." (quoting Sarfaty v. Evangelist, 530
N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988))).
60. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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With respect to the matter of uncertainty, it was noted above that
most of the parol agreement cases required it,61 while the cases on
acquiescence were divided on the question.6 2 It is submitted that if
uncertainty or dispute is not required in the case of acquiescence
where there has not been an express agreement by 0 giving up some
of his property, then a fortiori it should not be required where the par-
ties have expressly agreed on the rights of the parties. If anything the
formal requirements should be greater, not less, when there has not
been an express understanding as to the boundary between the par-
ties. But more importantly, as was argued above, the uncertainty re-
quirement itself has no defensible policy justification and merely
serves to frustrate the repose function of the practical location doc-
trines. It therefore should be eliminated.
The other major difference between the rules as to parol agree-
ments and acquiescence lies in the time of possession required. There
are some cases in the former area that do not seem to require that the
possession following an agreement be for any particular length of
time,6 3 while the cases on acquiescence require a longer period. One
could argue for requiring a shorter period of time when the agreement
is express, but it is submitted that the period of the statute of limita-
tions is an indication of legislative intent that non-written transfers of
interests in land should be recognized only after the passage of a sub-
stantial period of time. It seems appropriate to use that legislatively
mandated period of time for all such informal transfers. With the in-
tegration of the parol agreement and acquiescence rules, it would ap-
pear one could formulate a universal rule concerning long term
possessions in boundary disputes. The proposed rule follows.
VI. A SUGGESTED RULE
What is suggested by this comparative examination of the rules
about acquiescence, parol agreements, and adverse possession is how
unnecessarily complicated the area has become. If one were to com-
bine the common elements of the three doctrines, at the same time
excluding those that lack a strong policy justification, a simplified but
sound rule of law integrating adverse possession and practical location
could be stated as follows: A non-permissive, exclusive, continuous,
clearly bounded possession by P of O's land for the period of the stat-
ute of limitations for an action in ejectment will result in a transfer of
ownership to her. A possession is permissive if 0 has expressly au-
thorized it for a temporary purpose, always intending to assert his ba-
sic ownership of the property in question; any other possession is non-
61. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
63. See CUNNGHi ET AL., supra note 12, § 11.8, at 817 & n.19.
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permissive. The possession, therefore, could be hostile in the sense
that 0 is antagonistic to P's possession and has ordered her off, with P
refusing to do so-the prototypical case of adverse possession. Or the
possession could be based on the fact that 0 and P have orally agreed
that the permanent line between them should be thus-and-so, with P
occupying to that line-the case of the so-called parol agreement. Or
the possession could result from a long-continuing silent assent by the
parties to their occupying to a certain line between them-the para-
digmatic case of acquiescence. As long as 0 has not given permission
for P's temporary occupancy, title would pass. The overall question to
be answered in these cases should always be, "would a reasonable
owner under the circumstances understand that the possessor has
been claiming the disputed property as her own for the statutory pe-
riod?" If the answer to that question is affirmative then title should
pass to the possessor.
There are some strong arguments for the above rule allowing un-
written transfers of the title to land. First, the policy of repose-of let
the situation be-is of the greatest importance in the case of land ti-
tles where certainty is such a significant value. In boundary dispute
cases the application of these doctrines of repose-i.e, of having a
long-continuing situation on the ground determine ownership-serves
the critical function of the clearing of land titles. Under our present
system there are a series of rules-in adverse possession involving the
required intent of P, and in practical location involving the required
dispute or uncertainty-that prevent the title clearing function of
these doctrines from operating. It is submitted that the elimination of
these repose-defeating rules, neither of which has strong policy sup-
port, would have benefits without any accompanying detriment.
Second, a unified rule passing title to a non-permissive long-term
possessor would avoid the presently existing problem of cases that fall
between the cracks of the complex rules concerning adverse possession
and practical location. As the law is now, the uncertain application of
the various rules thwarts the proper handling of cases deserving of
appropriate title clearance.64 Lastly, the suggested rule furthers the
policy of protecting O's reasonable expectations concerning P's inten-
tions. In general we should not take title away from 0 if he had no
reason to suspect that P might be intending to make an adverse claim
to the land, as in the case where 0 has given P a temporary permis-
sion to occupy. P's acceptance of O's temporary authorization would
64. See, e.g., Markovich v. Chambers, 857 P.2d 906 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to
quiet the title in a long term possessor up to a fence line because he had not
established the requisite hostility for adverse possession purposes or the requi-
site uncertainty for practical location purposes); see also Wallace v. Putman, 495
So. 2d 1072 (Ala. 1986); Mehdizadeh v. Mincer, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); Shultz v. Johnson, 654 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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be a lulling indication that she agrees the land is O's and that 0 need
not fear an adverse claim by P. Thus, 0 would not have been alerted
that he must sue P or lose out in a suit over title to the property. But
in the above non-permissive situations-involving hostility, oral
agreement or acquiescence-O should reasonably be aware that P is
claiming the property as owner and that he must assert his rights
against P or risk forever forfeiting title.
With the elimination of the uncertainty requirement and the use of
the period of the statute of limitations for all of these kinds of informal
transfers, a simple, easy to administer rule would replace the current
body of law which suffers from the great disadvantages of unpredict-
ability and uncertainty. Those are drawbacks particularly unaccept-
able in the area of land titles where stability and predictability are
imperatives.
